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Harry Dunleavy appeals an order of the United States District Court for the
District of New Jersey granting summary judgment in favor of the Montville Board of
    1During the course of the proceedings, Dunleavy voluntarily dismissed, through
counsel, other defendants he had named and other claims he had raised in his complaint.
2
Education, the Principal of Montville High School, Steven Kramer, and the Supervisor of
Business and Mathematics, Sandra Alon (the “School Defendants”), in his age
discrimination action.  For the reasons that follow, we will affirm. 
Montville High School advertised two mathematics teaching positions for the
2002-2003 school year.  Dunleavy, who was then 60 years old, applied for a position. 
Dunleavy had the requisite teaching certification.  He had last worked as an Adjunct
Professor of Mathematics at Sussex County Community College.  Dunleavy was invited
to interview for a teaching position.  Kramer and Alon interviewed Dunleavy but did not
invite him back for the second round of interviews.  Upon completion of the hiring
process, Kimberly Deamer, who was 28 years old, and Jeffrey Schutzer, who was 43
years old, were offered the teaching positions.
Dunleavy filed suit in the District Court against the School Defendants raising
claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621- 634
(“ADEA”), and the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 10:5-1-
10:5-49 (“NJLAD”).1  The School Defendants moved for summary judgment.  In granting
the motion, the District Court held that Dunleavy established a prima facie case of
discrimination, but he did not show that the School Defendants’ legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for not hiring him was a pretext for discrimination.  
This appeal followed.  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our
    2McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
    3We apply the same legal principles to Dunleavy’s NJLAD claim.  See Keller v. Orix
Credit Alliance, 130 F.3d 1101, 1114 n.5 (3d Cir. 1997) (en banc).
    4Although the School Defendants do not agree with the District Court’s conclusion that
Dunleavy established a prima facie case of discrimination, they do not appeal that
decision.  Appellees’ Br. at 8.
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standard of review is plenary.  Kautz v. Met-Pro Corp., 412 F.3d 463, 466 (3d Cir. 2005).
As recognized by the District Court, the McDonnell Douglas2 burden-shifting
framework applies to claims of discrimination under the ADEA.  Stanziale v. Jargowsky,
200 F.3d 101, 105 (3d Cir. 2000).3  Under this framework, if a plaintiff establishes a
prima facie case of discrimination, the burden of production shifts to the defendant to
offer evidence that is sufficient, if believed, to support a finding that the defendant had a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment decision.  Id.  
If a defendant satisfies this burden, a plaintiff may then survive summary judgment
by submitting evidence from which a factfinder could reasonably either (1) disbelieve the
employer’s articulated legitimate reason; or (2) believe that an invidious discriminatory
reason was more likely than not a motivating or determinative cause of the employer’s
action.  Id.  The issues in this appeal are whether the District Court correctly decided that
the School Defendants established a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the decision
not to hire Dunleavy and, if so, whether Dunleavy established that the reason was a
pretext for discrimination.4
In their summary judgment motion, the School Defendants explained that
4Dunleavy was not chosen for a teaching position because he lacked recent high school
teaching experience, and he lacked the ability and willingness to integrate computers into
the daily curriculum.  Sandra Alon submitted an affidavit stating that, during the
interview, it was apparent that Dunleavy was not sufficiently familiar with certain
computer programs to incorporate them into the classroom.  She also stated that Dunleavy
admitted during the interview that he had not taught public school since 1977.  Alon
further explained that Kimberly Deamer and Jeffrey Schutzer satisfied these
requirements.  We agree with the District Court that the School Defendants established
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the decision not to hire Dunleavy.  See Fuentes
v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 763 (3d Cir. 1994) (noting that the employer’s burden to
articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason is “relatively light”). 
We further agree with the District Court that, in response to the summary judgment
motion, Dunleavy pointed to no evidence from which a factfinder could reasonably
disbelieve the School Defendants’ articulated legitimate reasons.  Dunleavy did not
establish that he had recent high school teaching experience.  To the contrary, Dunleavy
stated in his deposition that his last permanent teaching position in a high school was in
1977.  Although he did some substitute high school teaching thereafter, Dunleavy could
not recall the years when he was so employed.  Moreover, even if Dunleavy did substitute
teach more recently, the record does not establish that the School Defendants knew about
this experience when they made the hiring decision.  Dunleavy could not recall at his
deposition if he discussed his substitute teaching during his interview.  He did not include
    5We agree with Dunleavy that there is no evidence supporting the statement in the
District Court’s opinion that Dunleavy admitted at his interview that he had no experience
using computers to teach in the classroom.  Although Dunleavy stated at his deposition
that he had not used computers to assist him in teaching, there is no evidence that he so
stated at his interview.  Rather, contrary to Alon’s affidavit, Dunleavy argues for the first
time in this appeal that he was not asked about computers at his interview.  Because
Dunleavy did not contend in District Court that a genuine issue of material fact exists on
this basis, we will not consider this argument.  See Dluhos v. Strasberg, 321 F.3d 365,
373 (3d Cir. 2003) (declining to address issues raised for the first time on appeal).
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this experience on his resume. 
Dunleavy also did not establish that during his interview he demonstrated his
ability and willingness to integrate computers into the daily curriculum.  In his affidavit,
Dunleavy stated only that he was told that such an ability and willingness, along with
recent teaching experience, were the most important factors in the School Defendants’
hiring decision.  Dunleavy did not state that he expressed to Alon and Kramer his ability
and willingness to use computers in the classroom.  To the contrary, Dunleavy stated at
his deposition that computers “really aren’t much use for math unless you want to
produce mathematical illiterates.”  Dunleavy Dep. at 20.  Also, in his brief to this Court,
Dunleavy expressed his disagreement with the School Defendants’ requirement that
teachers use certain technologies to teach math.  See Appellant’s Br. at 6-7.  Dunleavy’s
personal beliefs about the utility of computers in the classroom do not cast doubt on the
School Defendants’ reason for not hiring him.5
Finally, Dunleavy did not establish that Deamer and Schutzer did not satisfy the
School Defendants’ requirements.  The resumes of these candidates reflect more recent
high school mathematics teaching experience than Dunleavy had.  In addition, Alon
    6The District Court also concluded that the statistical evidence Dunleavy submitted to
support his claim did not establish an inference of discrimination.  Dunleavy does not
challenge this conclusion on appeal, and we have not considered it.  
6
attested that both candidates had incorporated technology into their teaching curriculums. 
In his brief, Dunleavy points to other factors, including his teaching certification in
Spanish and graduate degrees, that he believes make him more qualified than these
candidates.  He submitted no evidence, however, that these factors were important to the
School Defendants in their hiring decision.
We conclude that Dunleavy has not shown that the reasons articulated by the
School Defendants for not hiring him were a pretext for discrimination.  See Kautz, 412
F.3d at 467 (noting that, to prove pretext, a plaintiff is required to present evidence
contradicting the core facts put forward by the employer as the legitimate reason for its
decision).  Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s order.6 
